Becoming a driver/operator can be a fairly intimidating step in one’s career.  No matter how much training and/or experience you had as a firefighter, the pressure of being the one responsible for the safety of an attack crew causes some to question what they know is right.

Over the past few years, I have discussed the following question numerous times with driver/operators of varying experience levels.  I am going to share the question, and my answer/opinion, with you.  Please feel free to share your thoughts.

The question is…

When pumping an attack line, should the operator pump what they are supposed to have by the numbers (length, size, flow, friction loss) or give them enough to start with (so as not to “beat up” the crew) and rely on radio communications to adjust?

My answer/opinion is…

Give them what the numbers say they are supposed to have.  It is the pump operator’s job to make sure that the attack crew has what they are supposed to have because…

• The safety and trust of the attack crew rests with their confidence in the operator to get them the water they need, when they need it.
• Radios are usually the weakest link in the fireground communications process and are unreliable for numerous reasons.
• Line size, length and nozzle selection is based on the numbers
• Neither the attack officer nor the IC can determine the effectiveness of the attack if they are not putting the CORRECT gpm on the fire to begin with.
• Any reductions in flow could/should indicate a kink in the line, burst or damaged section, or mechanical problem with the pump. It should never be a result of operator error.

Though noble is theory, the most common reasoning I’ve heard behind lower pressures initially is to make it easier on the attack crew.  However, there is a fundamental breakdown with this theory.  If the nozzle firefighter cannot handle the nozzle, it may be due to lack of training, improper nozzle positioning (i.e. pistol grips), lack of adequate backup on the line or any combination of these.

Though it’s drivers who usually bring up the question of attack line pressure, the issue is really  brought about by firefighters who express concern about nozzle pressure (having too much).  I stand by my opinion and would encourage crews to practice nozzle tactic training, especially the teamwork between the nozzle and backup firefighters.  Most fires are controlled with the first attack line.  There is also a cliche that “as the first line goes, so goes the fire.”  With that being said, let’s get it right the first time and take the fight to the fire.

Below are a few links to give you some training ideas.

Thanks and Be SAFE

Video from Brotherhood Instructors- Engine Company Ops

Article/Post from Traditions Training- “Play Like You Practice…”

I started this blog to educate members of the fire service as to what it REALLY means to be a safe, aggressive, fundamentally sound and efficient firefighter.  The interaction of all these principles is equally as important as any one by itself.  Of each of these, the principle of being aggressive seems to be the black sheep that no one really wants to talk about due to its “stigma”.

If you are not willing to aggressively perform ALL of the tasks necessary to extinguish a fire, then you are, or will be, lacking in the other three principles.

In our business, being aggressive reflects confidence in your abilities and those of your crew(s). There are, however, conditions to being an aggressive firefighter/crew. Lack of adherence to these conditions results in the actions of the ignorant and foolish and THIS is what causes firefighter injuries and deaths. This ignorance, disguised as being brave and aggressive is what gives the term “aggressive” its stigma.

To be truly aggressive at a fire, you have to:

• Know and understand ALL equipment on your rig
• Know and understand your role on the fireground
• Know and understand ALL types of building construction
• Know and understand how to “read smoke”
• Understand the effects of fire on roof and floor systems
• Size-up the building and fire conditions BEFORE making tactical decisions (regardless of rank)
• Fully understand the principles of BTU vs. GPM
• Understand what aggressive AND coordinated ventilation means
• Realize that ladders are for US also
• Realize that a fire is not out until we put it out
• Realize that a building is not clear until we clear it
• Have adequate resources on scene to execute “Plan B”
• Be able do ALL of these things at EVERY fire!

If you, as a firefighter, fire officer and/or command officer can account for all of the above, then your decisions will be educated and your risks will be managed.  However, if you cannot, then you may be flirting with disaster.  Will you be aggressive…or ignorant?

Thanks and Be SAFE.

I caught this on vententersearch.com the other day and then was forwarded a link to additional info by LT Derek Franks (BTFD T375).  This door is pretty intense and, if not identified recognized on scene, could waste time and energy should we have to gain entry into a building.

Essentially, they are high security, reinforced steel doors with up to six (6) dead bolts (controlled by a single lock) and dressed to look like standard residential wooden doors.  Though it’s deceiving, shocking the door prior to attempting to force it should help you identify its construction as well as strong, and not-as-strong, points.

After seeing pictures and watching the video, it seems that either a K12 or solid through-the-lock techniques may be the best option if you find yourself up against this door.  Since all of the throws are controlled by one lock, pulling or spinning the lock and using key tools should be pretty quick.

Here are some links to info about the doors and to some tactics for forcible entry:

Residential Security Door – from vententersearch.com

Master Security Doors – Manufacturer’s website

How It’s Made – Master Security Door YouTube Video

Shocking Doors – YouTube video from Brotherhood Instructors

Through-the-Lock – YouTube video from Bellingham Fire Department

I try to read as many close call and LODD reports that I can cram into my schedule, but the one “report” that has influenced EVERY aspect of my career as a fireman came from my dad.  If anyone wonders, or has ever wondered, why I think, act, talk, teach and fight fire the way that I do…THIS IS WHY!

I first heard his account of this event when I was a fire explorer for Indy Fire Department.  He told the story to our group when asked about his “scariest” experience as a firefighter.  I asked him to retell his story for this post:

Back in the early 80′s, he responded to a fire at the Howard Johnson Hotel on the East side of Indianapolis.  Upon arrival, he was assigned fire attack with another firefighter.  They knew they had a working fire but were unsure of the fire’s location, so they had to go in and search for it.  They stretched a preconnected 150’ and made entry.  Their search for the fire led them into the amenities area of the hotel (conference rooms, pool, sauna, etc.).  According to my dad, conditions were not bad at all, with low heat and visibility about 2 –3 feet off of the floor (NOTE: PPE of the day was hip boots and NO flash hoods, so low heat meant low heat).

As they continued their search through the winding hallways toward the saunas, conditions remained about the same.  Performing a oriented-style search, my dad, searching from behind the nozzleman, searched into a bathroom area then returned to the line.  Just past this point, they discovered that they were out of line.

They radioed for more hose and/or an additional line to be brought in and they held their position.  As they held, flames began to flicker through the overhead smoke.  Despite the visibility and lack of heat, they recognized this as a sign of flashover and penciled the ceiling to control the conditions and cool the upper atmosphere.

He says that when they penciled through the smoke, a commonly taught pre-flashover nozzle tactic, it was like spraying gasoline onto the fire, only up to that point they had not seen any fire.  He says the entire area lit up instantly and violently, “like a bomb went off,” as he described it.  He reacted by burying himself facedown on the floor, his partner setting the nozzle to wide fog and spraying it above him as a water curtain.  It worked and they were able “ride out” the event.

In the scramble, my dad had become separated from the hoseline.  He quickly found a wall and followed it to where he thought was the way out.  As he slammed into a wall in front of him, he left a perfect imprint of his helmet in the sheetrock and, simultaneously realized that he was back in the bathroom that he had previously searched.  Reversing his direction on the wall he made his way back out to the hallway where he found his partner still on the line.  The two of them made their hasty exit as “everything was burning and falling down around them.”

Once they were close to the building’s exit, they were found and dragged the rest of the way by the “rescue team” (an impromptu RIC) sent in to get them.  My dad, his partner and the crew from the second line, who had almost made their way to my dad’s crew, were all transported, treated and released with burns around the neck and head (no hoods).

My dad was told by other firefighters on the scene that, from the outside, all they saw was a fireball.  My mom, listening to the scanner in our kitchen, heard the radio traffic for the explosion, the Mayday and the lost firefighters.  Knowing my dad would be one of them, my mom went to scene, arriving as he was being pulled out of the building.

The cause of the fire was determined to be faulty wiring in the sauna.   The conditions, and subsequent fire event that my dad’s crew encountered were attributed to building layout and construction features.  The sauna area had no windows and only one door that sealed shut.  The heat and smoke that they encountered throughout their search was dormant smoke from the fire that had consumed all of the fuel in the room.  However, heat and smoke had collected above the acoustic ceiling tiles, but did not have enough air, or an ignition source, to fully burn.  As a result of this, when the flameover occurred below the ceiling tiles and the nozzleman directed the stream into the upper atmosphere, dislodging the ceiling tiles, he unknowingly introduced both air and an ignition source to the area above the ceiling tiles, causing the event.  My dad finally described the events as “causing a backdraft by trying to prevent a flashover.”

The lessons that my dad learned and shared with me include:

• The importance of wearing all of your PPE properly
• The importance of realistic, hands-on, fire tactic training
• Training on life-saving tactics to the point that they are instinct
• Maintaining situational awareness, even during fireground emergencies
• The importance of a formal and disciplined Incident Commander
• The importance of disciplined crews
• The importance of training and continuing education in general, but especially building construction

Throughout my career, and especially now as an instructor, these lessons have echoed in my mind.  During that HoJo fire, despite everyone doing their job in an organized and disciplined manner, things still went wrong.  However, because everyone remained organized and disciplined, the outcome was positive.

Firefighting is inherently dangerous.  Despite this, mastering the fundamentals, learning your craft and staying current on technology, strategy and tactics can, and will, save your life.

Thanks and Be SAFE.

Being able to teach firefighters from throughout the state gives me the opportunity to listen to, and have discussions with, people from departments of all sizes and demographics.  I try to draw from the positive information and purge the negative comments.  However, one of the most frustrating comments that I hear from firefighters while discussing strategy and tactics is “we can’t do that stuff like those big departments.” Usually, they are referring to things like truck work, rapid intervention and having seemingly endless resources.  However, these are usually excuses used to shield themselves from new ideas.  Strategy and tactics are based more on decision making  and skill proficiency than equipment and manpower.  The size of your department does NOT matter!

The first five minutes of any fire are the most critical. More so, the decisions and actions of the first arriving unit(s) determine the success of the operations.  If your first arriving unit is staffed with three firefighters (because that’s farfetched), their ability to assess the situation, determine what needs to be done and begin doing it will have a greater affect on the outcome than six units on scene with no direction.

If  your department has fewer resources, having the right attitude, leadership and management may establish a culture of superior firefighting that compensates for its lack of size with intelligent decisions and aggressive and properly executed tactics.  Some suburban and rural departments may be fairly strong with their First Alarm assignment but may have extended response times and/or rely on mutual aid beyond that.  In a case like this, even an advanced single family dwelling fire should be easily manageable, however it is vital for the initial units to be able to work together as well as be proficient as individual crews.  This could mean the difference between a solid First Alarm stop and a 2nd Alarm or greater catastrophe.

The late Tom Brennan said,“I don’t want to do anything (task) first. I want to do seven things all at once.” While this should be a the attitude of any firefighter, officer or Incident Commander, with limited resources you may have prioritize those tasks. For example, at a residence fire you have people trapped with fire showing from one window, since you know where the fire is but not the victims, you may choose to remove the problem by extinguishing the fire.  However, if you have people trapped with only smoke showing, since you don’t know where the fire is,  you may opt to prioritize a search and/or ventilation.  Ideally, you want to carry out fire attack, search and ventilation simultaneously. If  you are the first arriving unit with distant or no backup, you may be forced to make some difficult decisions.

When a fire happens, it is not the public’s concern how many firefighters show up.  All they know is that there is a fire with entrapment and they expect us to show up, save lives and put the fire out.  Period.  If we show up and perform proficiently and professionally, we can maintain a positive relationship with the public.  The public want results, not excuses.  When the bell rings, and its time to go to work, remember that size doesn’t matter.

The following is an article contributed by Chris Garniewicz, a Truck Captain for the Bluffton Township Fire District.  He was the first due truck officer at the following incident and these are his accounts and lessons learned from that fire:

On September 11^th, 2009 at 2107 hours, Bluffton Fire responded to a reported (building) fire at 154 Bluffton Road.  While companies were enroute, Dispatch advised there were multiple calls for the fire.  The first due company was delayed, so the truck and the second due engine arrived first together with the Battalion Chief.  A thermal column was seen on approach, and on arrival there was heavy smoke pushing from the eaves and doors of a 5000 square foot, 13-unit storage facility.  Apparatus positioning was a challenge, due to very narrow and obstructed driveways, requiring the engine to position on the Alpha side for fire attack while the truck positioned on the Charlie/Delta corner and split crews, establishing two forcible entry teams.

The building was type 2B construction, with no fire stops between units (overhaul revealed an approximately 6” gap at ceiling level, allowing fire and heat to spread between all units).  Due to the mixture of combustibles within the units, the smoke was thick and dark.  First arriving companies identified the unit of origin by the warping and discoloration of the steel doors and metal siding.

The decision was made by the engine officer to aggressively attack the unit of origin, then the units on all sides working out from the fire.  Truck crews were assigned to open all the doors to facilitate attack and overhaul. During forcible entry operations, truck members were met with a few challenging lock configurations and locations.  The number of locks and lock types created a time issue.  As a result, crews decided to cut the door instead of wasting time with removing multiple locks.

In order to access the fire units and exposure units quickly, the truck crew initially made “A” cuts to allow for knockdown, then came back during overhaul and made full height and width horizontal cuts to allow safer operations within the units.  The initial cut into the fire units allowed the engine crew to stop the fire spread rapidly and minimize damage to the other units. In all, 13 overhead doors were cut and/or forced and the fire was extinguished with two handlines. The aggressive tactics and coordinated efforts of the companies allowed for a large

and challenging fire to be contained to the area of origin,

Sizing up commercial building for forcible entry problems gives companies a heads up when faced with a fire like that at Taylor Warehouse.  Crews were able to make decisions that allowed for quick access and a good stop.  Like anything in the fire service, we can’t be proficient at something we don’t practice.  Take out the saws, find something to cut (scrap, old locks, etc.) and know what you are capable of accomplishing prior to the emergency.

Today is my first full day of being part of the Fire/EMS Blog network.  I have a ton of new content coming around the corner.  However, I am on vacation.  I’ll be adding articles on LODD as well as an article, from my first contributor, talking about strategy and tactics for forcing multiple overhead doors.

Since the purpose of my site is to bring up ways to better yourself through various avenues, I would encourage those of you who visit my site to go to the “partners” drop down at the top of the page and wonder through all of the other blogs in the network.  There are some great fire and EMS minds at work and there is a lot of information to be shared.

The more points of view you can see, the closer you’ll get to seeing the whole picture.  Enjoy the new site and enjoy the new network!

FTM-PTB and Be Safe

The final part of the series on understaffed truck work is search.  At the end of the day, regardless of staffing, our primary reason for existence is to find and help those who cannot help themselves… to save lives.  We accomplish this by entering IDLH atmospheres, locating and removing victims.  Victims are not the only reason why we search buildings.  It is also beneficial for a well-trained and experienced crew to enter the building ahead of the hose line, search for and find the fire. By searching for victims AND fire, we can increase the speed of fire attack and extinguishment which creates a safer fireground for everyone.

Though there are countless ways to search a building, a few of the most popular are the Directional Search (Left-hand/Right-hand), Oriented Search and Vent-Enter-Search.  Each of these methods demand an effective size-up of the building and fire conditions as well as consideration of the staffing, training and experience of your crew.

Here are some examples:

A two person search crew could easily search an 1800 sqft, 1-story single-family dwelling (SFD) with two to four bedrooms using a Directional Search.

However, 3 firefighters, or multiple search crews, may be needed to accomplish an oriented-large area type search in a 4000 sqft SFD five or more bedrooms.

Now let’s consider a 2000 sqft, 2-story SFD with heavy fire on the first floor.  In this house, the three or four bedrooms are most likely upstairs and passing the fire poses a risk for the search crew.  Also, because one or two handlines may be in operation, the first floor may be crowded.  Entering a crowded first floor and having to find the stairs can consume a lot of time and air.  In this case, a vent-enter-search (VES) method may be ideal, particularly with our two-person search crew.  It will allow you to search the “high risk” areas while minimizing time, exposure to the IDLH atmosphere and air consumption.  Now let’s talk about some important factors for completing each type of search.

Directional Search

• Most basic search technique
• Easily performed by two person search crew
• Members search together either in line or spread out side by side but almost always within reach
• Accountability and progress are easily tracked by IC
• Completed one room at a time

Oriented Search

• Very quick and effective (if trained)
• Ideal for search crews of 3 or more, but can be performed by 2 firefighters
• One person stays at the doorway or on the wall (stays oriented) while the other member(s) search rooms or general areas
• Allows the middle of larger rooms/areas to be searched
• Very beneficial in today’s “open” floor plan homes and commercial occupancies
• Members stay in voice or visual contact
• Members can conserve air by alternating who searches and who is oriented
• With 3-firefighter crew, two members can search different rooms (within voice and/or visual contact of oriented member) enabling a faster search and less time in the building.

Vent-Enter-Search (VES)

• VES is started from the exterior of the building, with search initiated from ladders
• Member(s) carry search tools AND an appropriate ground ladder(s)
• Systematic room-to-room search
• Member(s) ladders and forces a window, proceeds to the doorway, sweeps the hallway around the door, shuts the door, searches the room, exits the room via ladder and moves the next window
• Great way for crew of limited manpower to access high risk areas quickly
• If the outside or search crew firefighters each carry a couple of ladders, they can ladder as they go, leaving the ladders at the searched ooms for means of egress for interior crews.

Searching is one of the most important tactics on the fireground.  If done safely and aggressively, it can be one of the most beneficial tactics performed in terms of stabilizing the incident and protecting life.  However, only a well-trained crew can accomplish an efficient search.  There is no “one size fits all” search method.  The ability to be flexible without losing speed or effectiveness may be the difference between a one-room fire and burning the roof off or the difference between life and death.

Additional Resources:

“VES Size up” from www.vententersearch.com (go to the November 22 post from Rick Van Sant to get the first hand account of the situation)
“Three Words that Can Save lives- vent-enter-search”, Mike Clumpner
“Vent Enter Search” from Fire engineering TV with DC Anthony Avillo and Frank Ricci