I try to read as many close call and LODD reports that I can cram into my schedule, but the one “report” that has influenced EVERY aspect of my career as a fireman came from my dad.  If anyone wonders, or has ever wondered, why I think, act, talk, teach and fight fire the way that I do…THIS IS WHY!

I first heard his account of this event when I was a fire explorer for Indy Fire Department.  He told the story to our group when asked about his “scariest” experience as a firefighter.  I asked him to retell his story for this post:

Back in the early 80′s, he responded to a fire at the Howard Johnson Hotel on the East side of Indianapolis.  Upon arrival, he was assigned fire attack with another firefighter.  They knew they had a working fire but were unsure of the fire’s location, so they had to go in and search for it.  They stretched a preconnected 150’ and made entry.  Their search for the fire led them into the amenities area of the hotel (conference rooms, pool, sauna, etc.).  According to my dad, conditions were not bad at all, with low heat and visibility about 2 –3 feet off of the floor (NOTE: PPE of the day was hip boots and NO flash hoods, so low heat meant low heat).

As they continued their search through the winding hallways toward the saunas, conditions remained about the same.  Performing a oriented-style search, my dad, searching from behind the nozzleman, searched into a bathroom area then returned to the line.  Just past this point, they discovered that they were out of line.

They radioed for more hose and/or an additional line to be brought in and they held their position.  As they held, flames began to flicker through the overhead smoke.  Despite the visibility and lack of heat, they recognized this as a sign of flashover and penciled the ceiling to control the conditions and cool the upper atmosphere.

He says that when they penciled through the smoke, a commonly taught pre-flashover nozzle tactic, it was like spraying gasoline onto the fire, only up to that point they had not seen any fire.  He says the entire area lit up instantly and violently, “like a bomb went off,” as he described it.  He reacted by burying himself facedown on the floor, his partner setting the nozzle to wide fog and spraying it above him as a water curtain.  It worked and they were able “ride out” the event.

In the scramble, my dad had become separated from the hoseline.  He quickly found a wall and followed it to where he thought was the way out.  As he slammed into a wall in front of him, he left a perfect imprint of his helmet in the sheetrock and, simultaneously realized that he was back in the bathroom that he had previously searched.  Reversing his direction on the wall he made his way back out to the hallway where he found his partner still on the line.  The two of them made their hasty exit as “everything was burning and falling down around them.”

Once they were close to the building’s exit, they were found and dragged the rest of the way by the “rescue team” (an impromptu RIC) sent in to get them.  My dad, his partner and the crew from the second line, who had almost made their way to my dad’s crew, were all transported, treated and released with burns around the neck and head (no hoods).

My dad was told by other firefighters on the scene that, from the outside, all they saw was a fireball.  My mom, listening to the scanner in our kitchen, heard the radio traffic for the explosion, the Mayday and the lost firefighters.  Knowing my dad would be one of them, my mom went to scene, arriving as he was being pulled out of the building.

The cause of the fire was determined to be faulty wiring in the sauna.   The conditions, and subsequent fire event that my dad’s crew encountered were attributed to building layout and construction features.  The sauna area had no windows and only one door that sealed shut.  The heat and smoke that they encountered throughout their search was dormant smoke from the fire that had consumed all of the fuel in the room.  However, heat and smoke had collected above the acoustic ceiling tiles, but did not have enough air, or an ignition source, to fully burn.  As a result of this, when the flameover occurred below the ceiling tiles and the nozzleman directed the stream into the upper atmosphere, dislodging the ceiling tiles, he unknowingly introduced both air and an ignition source to the area above the ceiling tiles, causing the event.  My dad finally described the events as “causing a backdraft by trying to prevent a flashover.”

The lessons that my dad learned and shared with me include:

• The importance of wearing all of your PPE properly
• The importance of realistic, hands-on, fire tactic training
• Training on life-saving tactics to the point that they are instinct
• Maintaining situational awareness, even during fireground emergencies
• The importance of a formal and disciplined Incident Commander
• The importance of disciplined crews
• The importance of training and continuing education in general, but especially building construction

Throughout my career, and especially now as an instructor, these lessons have echoed in my mind.  During that HoJo fire, despite everyone doing their job in an organized and disciplined manner, things still went wrong.  However, because everyone remained organized and disciplined, the outcome was positive.

Firefighting is inherently dangerous.  Despite this, mastering the fundamentals, learning your craft and staying current on technology, strategy and tactics can, and will, save your life.

Thanks and Be SAFE.

The following is an article contributed by Chris Garniewicz, a Truck Captain for the Bluffton Township Fire District.  He was the first due truck officer at the following incident and these are his accounts and lessons learned from that fire:

On September 11^th, 2009 at 2107 hours, Bluffton Fire responded to a reported (building) fire at 154 Bluffton Road.  While companies were enroute, Dispatch advised there were multiple calls for the fire.  The first due company was delayed, so the truck and the second due engine arrived first together with the Battalion Chief.  A thermal column was seen on approach, and on arrival there was heavy smoke pushing from the eaves and doors of a 5000 square foot, 13-unit storage facility.  Apparatus positioning was a challenge, due to very narrow and obstructed driveways, requiring the engine to position on the Alpha side for fire attack while the truck positioned on the Charlie/Delta corner and split crews, establishing two forcible entry teams.

The building was type 2B construction, with no fire stops between units (overhaul revealed an approximately 6” gap at ceiling level, allowing fire and heat to spread between all units).  Due to the mixture of combustibles within the units, the smoke was thick and dark.  First arriving companies identified the unit of origin by the warping and discoloration of the steel doors and metal siding.

The decision was made by the engine officer to aggressively attack the unit of origin, then the units on all sides working out from the fire.  Truck crews were assigned to open all the doors to facilitate attack and overhaul. During forcible entry operations, truck members were met with a few challenging lock configurations and locations.  The number of locks and lock types created a time issue.  As a result, crews decided to cut the door instead of wasting time with removing multiple locks.

In order to access the fire units and exposure units quickly, the truck crew initially made “A” cuts to allow for knockdown, then came back during overhaul and made full height and width horizontal cuts to allow safer operations within the units.  The initial cut into the fire units allowed the engine crew to stop the fire spread rapidly and minimize damage to the other units. In all, 13 overhead doors were cut and/or forced and the fire was extinguished with two handlines. The aggressive tactics and coordinated efforts of the companies allowed for a large

and challenging fire to be contained to the area of origin,

Sizing up commercial building for forcible entry problems gives companies a heads up when faced with a fire like that at Taylor Warehouse.  Crews were able to make decisions that allowed for quick access and a good stop.  Like anything in the fire service, we can’t be proficient at something we don’t practice.  Take out the saws, find something to cut (scrap, old locks, etc.) and know what you are capable of accomplishing prior to the emergency.